| URBAN GROWTH AND ISTANBUL : A Rise in Population from 1 Million to 12 Million |
Kaynak :
04.09.2006 -
1st Urban Design International Congress bildirisi
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Yazdır
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First settled 2600 years ago, Istanbul lies along both sides of the Bosphorus strait dividing the continents of Asia and Europe. The city became capital to three empires: the Roman 330-395 AD, the Byzantine 395-1453 and Ottoman 1453-1923. In 1923 the Turkish Republic was founded on the remains of the Otoman Empire. Ankara was designated Turkey’s new capital, and although Istanbul lost its funetion as the political hub of the country, it remained the economic and cultural centre. Urban growth is not a new phenomenon in Istanbul. Throughout its history the city has attracted new settlers. According to the census carried out for military purposes on the orders of the Byzantine emperor just before the Turkish conquest, the population of the queen city was around 35,000. Yet prior to the Crusader occupation of 1204 the population had been between 800,000 and one million. When the Fourth Crusade army saw Constantinople in June 1203 they were overwhelmed by the city’s beauty, size, power and wealth. Over the nearly 60 years (1204-1261) of Latin occupation, however, destruction, systematic plunder and tyranny caused the greater part of the population to flee the ir homes, turning it into a virtual ghost city. The city suffered under the yoke of Italian imperialism between 1261 when the Crusaders departed and the Ottoman conquest of 1453. The Spanish ambassador Clavijo, who visited the Byzantine city in 1403, described a city mostly in ruins that had deteriorated into a large village. Following the Ottoman conquest Sultan Mehmed II set about repopulating his new capital and restoring its former wealth and splendour. Noble Byzantine families who had fled to the provinces were encouraged to return and prisoners serving sentences for looting were pardoned and even given temporary exemption from taxation so that they would return and settle in the district of Fener on the Golden Horn. Four thousand families of merchants and craftsmen from the Asian and European provinces of the empire were brought to the city by persuasion or sentence of exile and settled in abandoned houses. These families were selected not according to whether they were Muslims or Christians but because their occupations would contribute to Istanbul’s economic revival. In later years more Christian merchants and craftsmen were brought from Amasra, Foça, Trabzon, Argos, Karaman, Midilli and Kefe, and settled in various districts. Sultan Mehmed’s aim was to create a cosmopolitan city that reflected the structure of the Ottoman Empire. Turks, Armenians, Jews, Slavs, Greeks and others moved to the city in large numbers from all over the Ottoman territories. An ambitious new building programme was initiated. According to a census carried out in 1477, the population of Istanbul proper and Galata on the opposite shore of the Golden Horn had risen to around 100,000. According to the Spanish traveler Cristobal de Villalon, in the 1550s during the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent, the population of Istanbul, Galata and Pera (today Beyoglu) totalled half a million, with a further 50,000 inhabitants in surrounding suburbs.¹ The population of Istanbul at the end of the 17th century is estimated at around 700,000. During the 17th and 18th centuries the emphasis shifted from encouraging to preventing population growth. It was not until the 17th century, when the first shanty town development occurred, that the city’s population once again approached its pre- 1204 level. Although all these population figures are no more than rough estimates, what is certain is that in the years 1520-1535 Istanbul was the world’s largest city, with a population of 400,000. In 1914, at the beginning of world War I, Istanbul’s population was 909,978,² but this figure fell in the course of the war. In an article entitled ‘Istanbul and City Planning’ that was published in the January 1931 issue of Mimar (Iater Arkitekt) magazine, the famous architect Alisanzade Sedad Hakkı expressed the following interesting ideas: ‘Over recent years Istanbul has gone through same significant phases. From being a capital city with a population of a million, it is now a city of 600,000 people. Not only has its population nearly halved, but it has lost the status that was the foremost source of its prosperity and wealth. Moreover, large jires have left a third of the city in ruins. The difficult economic situation of the country as a whole is naturally an obstacle facing planning activity in Istanbul. In addition, the fact that the various districts are widely scattered, and that the city in general is too big for the present population poses certain questions for the city planner: Where should the boundary of Istanbul be? .. ‘If we think a little, it becomes evident that Istanbul is changing with rapid strides. It is no exaggeration to say that these changes are gradually diminishing the city’s beauty. Istanbul’s population explosion began with changes in the agricultural structure of the country and the expansion of industrialisation after World War II. The population has since risen from around one millian in 1950 to 12 millian today. The advent of the tractor created rural unemployment, and this factor combined with the economic and social policies of the Democrat Party, which came to power in the elections held on 14 May 1950, sped up rural migration. Industrialisation and services developed in the country’s major cities, attracting those in search of employment, but no economic, physical or social planning measures were taken to meet the needs of urban growth. The government took a laissez faire attitude to the situation in its ambition to create a new America and La millionaire in every neighbourhood’. Rural migratian focused mostly towards Istanbul, which has traditionally been seen as a place where ‘the streets are paved with gold’. The newcomers needed shelter, and since the government took no steps to provide homes, they illegally built their own shelters on unoccupied state-owned land. Taking advantage of the law by which the occupants could not be evicted from their illegal dwellings once they had be en roofed, these shanty homes were usually built in the night and the roof quickly put in place, so that they became known as gece kondu (‘put up in the night’). In this way shanty towns grew rapidly. In the early years of the Turkish Republic, established in 1923, the first shanty homes were built around the railway line at Kazlıcesme in Zeytinburnu, elose to the textile mills. This early shanty town was known as ‘tin town’ because large flattened tins were used as a cheap façade and roof covering. As the years past, shanty town growth lost this innocent character and became a flourishing black market sector. After a new law permitting individual ownership of a single storey was passed, contractors began constructing blocks of flats in return for ownership of some of the flats. This system exacerbated speculation in building land. Following this lead, owners of illegal single storey shanty homes began adding additional storeys. Taking advantage of government inability to protect state-owned land from occupation, forcible occupation of this land and illegal sales of building plots began. Prior to 1980 radical groups used the same method to create illegal neighbourhoods. Shanty houses were no longer a way for poor rural migrants in search of work to house themselves, but a big business for organised crime. The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that local authorities turned a blind eye to shanty town development. Huge suburbs created entirely illegally, such as Sultanbeyli, Dudullu, Küçükçekmece, Kagıthane and Mahmutbey, grew up around the city. Shanty towns and illegal land development became tools of political profiteering. Since shantytown dwellers now accounted for nearly half the populations of major cities their votes could make and break governments. This created a vicious circle by which successive governments, instead of seeking solutions to the problem, acted hand in hand with the profiteers of shanty town development, and pardons were regularly issued giying legal status to the shanty dwellings. Not only did governments pursue votes by such populist measures at election time, but sat back and watched while illegal building swallowed up public land, forests and water catchment basins. Opposition parties only objected half-heartedly to this pillage from the same concern for votes. All the cities, but primarily Istanbul, suffered from this lack of authority and illegalities. To add to this, the government and local authorities took ostensibly legal actions to increase building density in urban areas, alter land use plans to allow increased building density on the pretext of developing tourism, and give wholesale permission to add new storeys to existing buildings. In the early years of the Turkish Republic, however, priority had been given to planning, and it was in those years that the first major planning initiative took place. A city planning competition for Istanbul was held in 1933, and that submitted by H. Elgötz was adopted, but when doubts about this plan arose in 1935, the proposals of the German city planner Prof. Martin Wagner were followed for a while. Around the same time Atatürk consulted Le Corbusier, who said that the city should be preserved exactly as it was. In an interview years later, Le Corbusier voiced his regrets about this, saying ‘It was a mistake to advise a great reformer like Atatürk to leave Istanbul exactly as it was ‘. 3 In 1936 Atatürk appointed the French city planner Henri Prost to prepare a master plan for Istanbul, and the 1:5000 scale plan for the Istanbul and Beyoglu peninsulas was approved in 1939. In a paper presented by Prost to the Académie des Beaux-Arts in Paris in 1947, he said of his experience in Istanbul: ‘We could compare the modernisation of Istanbul to a very difficult operation. lt was an undertaking very different to creating a new city on empty land. lt was necessary to guide an ancient capital city which had undergone a radical social revolution towards a future where living conditions were going to change as a result of developments in prosperity and perhaps differentiation of levels ‘. 4 Prost worked for 15 years with a team of French and Turkish architects and engineers, drawing up plans for three principal areas: the historical walled city, Beyoglu, and the area encompassing Kadıköy and Üsküdar on the Asian shore of the Bosphorus. Until 195.0 these plans were meticulously implemented by Lütfi Kırdar, governor and mayor of Istanbul. However, as the years went by, plans drawn up for a population projected to reach 800,000 became increasingly inadequate, since no one had foreseen the high population growth that actually occurred. Nevertheless, the principles adopted by the Prost plan and which were followed in subsequent years remain valid taday. For example, the prohibition on any buildings over four stories in areas more than 40 metres above sealevel that was introduced to preserve the silhouette of the historic city and preserve the existing building density saved this area for posterity. Gülhane Park (designated Park No. 1) and, despite numerous encroachments, the Taksim-Maçka Dolmabahçe triangle (Park No. 2) are further illustrations of these principles. On the other hand, the plan was hampered by the failure to accurately predict Istanbul’s future population growth and made the mistake of permitting industrial development on the Golden Horn. Prost returned to France in 1951 after the election of a new government in 1950. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes became obsessed by Istanbul ‘s planning problems in the second half of the 1950s. In 1951 the Revision Committee was established to review Prost’s plans, 5 and in subsequent years, on the advice of this committee, aboard of consultants was setup.6 In 1958 Istanbul Planning Office was established by Menderes to draw up a new master plan. Several foreign experts were consulted, including Sir Patrick Abercrombie (1954), Prof. Hans Högg (1956) and Prof. Luigi Piccinato (1958), but despite all these planning initiatives, the prime minister set scientific methods aside and took the planning of Istanbul into his own hands. From 1955 he devoted most of his time to Istanbul, taking decisions himself, and personally overseeing their implementation. Menderes was influenced by Baran Haussmann’s transformatian of Paris, 7 and his activities focused primarily on resolving traffic problems, destroying extensive historic are as by building new roads and widening old ones, without effective planning to back up these schemes. Menderes was also influenced by the wide boulevards and other evidence of new city planning that he had seen during his visit to Tehran in 1956. |
The coast road between Sirkeci and Ataköy, Vatan Street, Millet Street, Barbaros Boulevard, Aksaray Square, the road from Dolmabahçe to Karaköy, and Salıpazarı harbour buildings all date from this period. The appointment of the ltalian Prof. Luigi Piccinato as Istanbul ‘s chief city planner in 1958 failed to halt the ruthless progress.
In four years 7289 buildings were demolished to make way for new roads and squares and widen existing roads, doing immense damage to the urban texture. Among the demolished buildings were historic mosques, mausoleums and hamam s that should have been preserved. The Menderes planning reforms were disastrous for Istanbul both financially and culturally. The cost to the Treasury was enormous, and failure to pay owners whose property had been compulsorily purchased caused hardship. The huge cost of Istanbul’s planning schemes played a major part in the fall of the Democrat Party government. Just as had happened in the case of Paris and Haussmann’s ventures, the resulting economic crisis and shortages led to political upheavals, and so to the military coup of 27 May 1960.8 Istanbul suffered most from the land exploitation that occurred throughout the country. Political lack of faith in the concept of planning meant that the few planning experiments that did take place failed to fulfil expectations. Even in the planned development period following 1960, planning focused rather on economic and social aspects, neglecting urban planning. During this period the Eastern Marmara Regional Planning and Greater Istanbul Master Plan offices were established, and between 1960 and 1967 Prof. L. Piccinato again served an advisory role. Piccinato opposed the northward development of the city, but despite this, the Bosphorus Bridge opened in 1973 and the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge opened in 1988 facilitated the spread of the city in this direction. The well-intentioned work on regional planning and a master plan launched in the 1960s was gradually eroded from 1980 onwards. Following that of Menderes, another operational wave took place while Bedrettin Dalan was mayor of Istanbul. When the Motherland Party came to power in 1983, Dalan took office as this party’s mayor, with the support of the 12 September junta administration, and, of ten bending or sidestepping the law, made the Golden Horn a blank slate, built coastal roads along the Bosphorus and the Golden Horn, demolished much of Tarlabası, and opened the way for the high – rise Park Hotel (16 storeys of which were later demolished), Gökkafes (Süzer Plaza), Swissotel, the Conrad Hotel, the skyscrapers of Levent-Maslak, and other huge buildings that are by many considered eyesores of the city today. Other highrise monstrosities for which Dalan had given permits appeared as unpleasant surprises after Dalan’s term in office was over. Dalan dreamed of turning Istanbul into anather Hong Kong; a city of skyscrapers and the most magnificent city of the Middle East. This aspiration dealt heavy blows to Istanbul’s visual heritage, magnificent silhouette and the scale of the city. Meanwhile, municipal authority over plots of land that had been designated as Tourism Areas by Government resolution was abrogated, and permission given for high buildings and high-density building, dealing Istanbul yet another blow. The Ministry of Building and Settlements, which had traditionally been responsible for building development and city planning in Turkey, was incorporated into the Ministry of Public Works after 1980, and the Greater Istanbul Master Plan Office established in 1966 given over to the Municipality. In this way, planning was left to the hands of inadequately qualified technical staff and local politicians. In summary, urbanisation gathered momentum, but the newcomers did not adapt to city life at the same rate, with the result that land which was essential for the future of the cities was eaten up by unplanned building, destroying historical, cultural and natural heritage. Settlers from rural areas failed to adapt to their new urban setting, and cultural, social and political degradation ensued. As rural culture came to dominate, the cities were reduced to vast villages. Planning is the tool of order. Planning and anarchy are conflicting concepts. When anarchy prevails, this is reflected in city planning and architecture. Anarchic building development is the outcome of national anarchy. Inconsistencies in the fields of settlement and planning that emerged in Turkey years ago have unfortunately continued ever since without interruption. From time to time governments have resorted to the sale of state-owned land as a means of alleviating economic crises. The sale of state – owned illegally occupied land to illegal occupiers has been seen as a major vehicle for raising state funds. Granting pardons for illegal occupancy in return for money has from time to time been considered. In this way, illegal settlement and the pillage of land would be legalised, so transferring the rights of those who obey the law to those who violate it. What is more the lass of this land entirely precluded any possibility of using it for rational purposes to raise the quality of life in the future. The quality of the buildings themselves is anather crucial issue. The law technical quality of shanty dwellings and illegal buildings poses a danger for their occupants in the event of earthquake. Recently the mayor of Istanbul announced that 80 percent of buildings in the city did not possess building permission. From a population of 800,000 in the 1920s, Istanbul today has a population of 12 million. The irregular and unplanned character of urbanisation and population growth has brought serious problems. Even when plans have been drawn up they have not achieved their objectives, because they have failed to keep up with the city’s rate of growth. Developments in Istanbul over the past 80 years can be summarised as follows: 1923 – 50 Planning initiatives under difficult economic conditions 1950 – 60 Unplanned development focusing on road widening 1960 – 80 Return to concept of planning 1980 onwards Planning governed by the market economy. Today The fact that governments have turned a blind eye to shanty town and illegal building development, regularly issuing pardons for illegal land occupancy, has encouraged migration to the cities and illegal building. The resu1t has been that Istanbul has spread without adequate controls, and its problems severely exacerbated. The city suffers from loss of identity, texture, silhouettes and scale, diminishing green areas, failure to preserve the natural and historical environment, and serious infrastructure and transportation prob1ems. Moreover, building stock with substandard construction poses a serious threat in the event of earthquake. Land in the city constantly rises in value, making it a subject of speculation and gain. Under pressure from investors and land owners, city plans have constantly been modified so as to allow increased building density and height. As buildings have grown larger and higher, infrastructure problems have grown accordingly, and transportation problems have become insoluble. Transport is one of Istanbul ‘s greatest problems. The main mistake from the beginning has been to give priority to private cars over public transport, focusing on roads rather than rail systems. The two Bosphorus bridges linking the European and Asian sectors of the city largely serve private cars, and this has made traffic problems even worse, as well as encouraging the uncontrolled spread of the city. In 2006, 600 new cars are added to Istanbul’s traffic load every day. The municipality hopes that underground roadways will ease city traffic, and 26 such roads are planned for the city, 19 on the European side and seven on the Anatolian side. The total length of these tunnels is 78.5 kilometres, and some are already under construction. Underground metro systems are long overdue. So far just eight kilometres of underground line (between Taksim and 4th Levent) is in operation. The most noteworthy transport initiative in Istanbul at present is the Marmaray project now under construction. This consists of a new 76 kilometre railway line stretching from Halkalı in the west to Gebze in the east. This line will go underground at Kazlıcesme on the European side of the city, cross the Bosphorus via a submerged tunnel between Sarayburnu and Üsküdar, and remerge overground at Sögütlücesme, This project, and a number of tram lines providing links with the main line, is a welcomed if overdue step towards expanding rail transport. Steps are also being taken to modernise the ferryboat services, which at one time played a key role in the city’s transportation system but were later neglected. In 2005 Istanbul Metropolitan Planning Office was established as part of Istanbul Municipality. This office, which employs a staff of 300 experts, has not yet been able to exert full authority in hurried government and municipality decisions relating to major investment projects designed for the most part to give the go-ahead to global companies planning to build in the city. Decisions to perrnit building at rnany critical points in the city are first taken by the governrnent and then planning rnodified to fit the circumstances.
1. Dimitri Kitsikis; L ‘Empire Ottoman, Que sais-je?, Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 78-80, Paris, 1994. 2. Osmanlı İmparatorlugu’nun ve Türkiye’nin Nüfusu 1500-1927, DIE Tarihi İstatistikler Dizisi. 3. Semra Demiren, Le Corbusier ile mülâkat (An interview with L.C, Arkitekt, No. 11-12, 1949 s.230-231 4. Sehri Düsünmek, Sehri Yaratmak, (To think and create the City) YKY 1996. 5. Revizyon Komitesi, (Revising Comittee) Kemal A.Arû (ITÜ), Cevat Erbel ve Mithat Yenen (iller Bankası), Mukbil Gökdogan (T. Y. Mühendisler Birligi), Muhittin Güven (T. Y.Mimarlar Birligi), Mehmet Ali Handan (GSA), Behçet Ünsal (YTO). 6. Müsavirler Heyeti, (Advisors Comittee)(1953-55): Kemal A.Arû, Cevat Erbel, Mukbil Gökdogan, Paul Bonatz (kısa bir süre için) ve Emin Onat (daha sonra Mehmet Ali Handan). 7. Georges-Eugène Haussmann was Governor of the Seine during the authoritarian regime of Emperor Napoleon III, and in charge of planning reform in Paris between 1853 and 1870. 8. When the general elections of 1869 ended with the victory of the Republicans, the emperor attempted to preserve his regime by a conciliatory stance, endeavouring to reconcile monarchy with liberalism. The liberal empire soon brought the end of the iron fisted ‘municipal dictator.’ Haussmann was forced to resign in January 1870, and the same year the empire was replaced by the Third Republic. |
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